Description
An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.
CVSS Metrics
- Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack Vector
- local
- Complexity
- high
- Privileges
- high
- User Action
- required
- Scope
- unchanged
- Confidentiality
- high
- Integrity
- high
- Availability
- high
- Weaknesses
- CWE-798CWE-798
Metadata
- Primary Vendor
- NOKIA
- Published
- 6/16/2023
- Last Modified
- 12/12/2024
- Source
- NIST NVD
- Note: Verify all details with official vendor sources before applying patches.
Affected Products
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